

## INFORMATION REPORT

**CONFIDENTIAL**COUNTRY RomaniaDATE DISTR. **16** June 1948 25X1SUBJECT Meeting of leaders of the Iron GuardNO. OF PAGES **2**25X1 PLACE  
ACQUIREDNO. OF ENCLS.  
(LISTED BELOW)

DATE OF INFO

SUPPLEMENT TO  
REPORT NO.

25X1

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leaders of the Iron Guard in Romania gathered in Bucharest to discuss the policy to be adopted by the remnants of that organization. Nicolae Patrascu, Horia Comanciu, Dr. Nitza Nedelcu, and G. Gane participated in the conference.

2. Patrascu, who had long favored the maintenance of good relations with the Groza Government, declared that war between the United States and the USSR was inevitable. Terror would be more widely used by the Communist regime in Romania. The time had come, therefore, for the Guard to support one or the other of the principal antagonists. Horia Sima, who had been pursuing a pro-American policy, might for that reason become a serious peril to the legionnaires in Romania. Good relations with the Groza Government were necessary to prevent the Iron Guard from being harried by the Romanian and Soviet authorities.

3. Gane, on the other hand, favored support of the Western Powers since otherwise the Guard would be accused of favoring the USSR. In his opinion, the legionnaires should be proud of Horia Sima and his policy. Comanciu, however, favored collaboration with the Groza Government, in order to avoid persecution. Although he believed that the United States would be victorious in an armed conflict, Comanciu declared that the Romanian Government should be told that the Guard would support the USSR in the event of war. He felt that if the Guard could maintain itself throughout such a conflict, it would be one of the few political movements which the United States could utilize for the reconstruction of Romania. Comanciu believed that the United States would utilize the Guard after a war, despite its collaboration with the Communist regime.

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4. Nedelcu favored support of the Western Powers, although he believed that the Guard should pretend to collaborate with the Groza Government. He considered Horia Sima as the best "ambassador" to the Americans. Patrascu then indicated that he had revised his previous opinions. Declaring that Sima remained the leader of the Guard and could not be criticized, he favored collaboration with the Groza Government as long as it remained powerful. Such collaboration, he declared, paid immediate dividends. He was able at any time to intervene in behalf of legionnaires who had been arrested and had secured the release of members of the Guard imprisoned by Antonescu.

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